Netra News interviewed hundreds of families and examined over 2,000 reports to map the killings
during Bangladesh’s 2024 crackdown. Of 750 verified deaths, at least 705 were likely caused by security
forces or ruling party cadres.
Two women in burkhas frantically ran through the narrow lanes
of a fish market behind East West University in Rampura. The Dhaka neighbourhood, dense with
private university campuses, had become a bloody battleground between protesters, armed police,
and pro-government cadres during last year’s student uprising.
Chaos had taken hold.
“A man told us to take this route to get to Farazy Hospital,” recalled Selina Begum,
“Because there’s heavy gunfire, the Rampura bridge was inaccessible.”
Moments earlier, just after the call to Zuhr prayer on July 18th, Selina had bolted
from her home with her daughter. Her son’s phone had rung. But it wasn’t him on the line.
“‘He’s been shot,’ a stranger told me,” she said in a recent interview.
By the time Selina reached the hospital, her son was gone, “The doctor said he was
in critical condition. They had sent him to a government hospital.”
Mugda Hospital, she guessed. It had to be. When they arrived, her son lay unconscious.
His body twitched in irregular spasms, like a fish out of water. He had suffered
75 pellet wounds across his upper torso, including his head.
Selim was moved across different private hospitals seeking treatment. For twelve days,
Selim clung to life in the ICU of a private hospital in Dhaka. To get him admitted there,
Selina was forced to sign a statement swearing that her son had not joined the student
protests. It didn’t matter. Her only son died anyway.
Md Selim Talukder, shot at close range by police, was one of hundreds killed during
a three-week massacre unleashed by Bangladesh’s then-ruling Awami League government.
What started as a student protest against the quota-based government job recruitment system
turned into a bloody anti-government protest after then-Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina sought
to quell it with brutal use of force.
Hasina fled to India on August 5th. An interim government succeeded her.
In December, the government published a gazette which included a list of 834 people
declared to be ‘martyrs’ of the massacre. But the list was not without discrepancies.
Over six months, Netra News spoke with the families of more than 650 victims, interviewed
local protest organisers, and reviewed over 2,000 news reports. The project aims to map where
the deaths occurred, identify possible perpetrators, and determine which security officials
were responsible for the relevant jurisdictions, ultimately seeking to understand the pattern
of state violence.
Netra News was able to verify and reconcile details of 750 deaths. Of these, we assessed
that at least 705 individuals were likely killed either by security forces or by
Awami League-affiliated cadres.
This is not to suggest that the remaining individuals listed in the official gazette
were not victims of the same violence. In several cases, Netra News was unable to
confirm the exact circumstances surrounding their deaths. Some accounts were ambiguous or
contradictory, and in those instances, we could not determine the likely perpetrator with a
high degree of confidence.
Medical ID ↑↓
Victim’s Name ↑↓
Region ↑↓
Alleged Perpetrator ↑↓
< 123 … 1112 >
Shoot first, aim later
Our analysis — based on accounts from victims’ families and news reports — suggests that half of
the victims out of 705 did not actively participate in the protests. They were pedestrians,
onlookers, or they joined the victory march after learning of Hasina’s ousting, unaware of any
imminent attacks. Some of them were shot while returning home, some went out to buy food, some
were
going to work, and some were even shot while on rooftops, balconies or inside their homes.
It appears that the security forces and Awami League cadres did not spend much time discerning
between the protesters and pedestrians or onlookers.
Human Rights Watch concluded in their report that the indiscriminate attacks on bystanders
“appeared
to be part of a broader pattern.” According to the report,
police shot at onlookers observing the scene from their homes, aiming to instil fear and convey
a
message that people should not watch what was happening around them.
Our findings indicate that 97.16% of the deaths caused by security forces or members of the Awami
League, or by both groups, were due to gunshots.
Timeline of violence: Daily total deadly incidents
Documenting the escalation and phases of violence from July 16th to August
5th, 2024
705
Confirmed Deaths
685
Killed due to Gunshots
267
Suffered deadly injuries on August 5
All victims who died from fatal wounds during the curfew days — from July 20th to July 22nd — were
shot, according to their families and news reports. This indicates that the forces enforcing the
curfew openly used firearms. The pattern continued on the final days of the regime, on August 4th
and August 5th.
Only a handful of victims died after being beaten or stabbed by Awami League-linked armed cadres. Two
victims died after an executive magistrate’s car rammed them in Sherpur, and two others were drowned
in Madaripur and Sylhet. The rest were gunned down.
At least 272 victims actively joined the protests, according to their families and news reports. Most
victims were young. Generation Z (individuals born between 1997 and 2012) not only led the movement
but also paid the ultimate price in droves. Our analysis shows 61.31% of the victims were from
Generation Z, followed by millennials (29.16%).
The youngest victim of the massacre was a four-year-old, and the oldest was in his seventies.
Killing Zones
As the July massacre unfolded, Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, saw the highest number of deaths, at
least 479, followed by other killing fields in Gazipur, Narayanganj and Narsingdi.
In Dhaka, the highest number of victims died after being fatally injured in Wari, an administrative
division of Dhaka Metropolitan Police, followed by Uttara, Mirpur and Gulshan divisions. Wari
comprises the Jatrabari and Kadamtali police stations. The officials of these stations are accused
of killing at least 107 victims.
Geographic distribution of violence in Dhaka city
Spatial analysis of fatalities across the administrative zones in Dhaka city during the July
Massacre
The violence was particularly indiscriminate on July 19th, 20th, and August 5th.
According to our analysis, at least 325 victims died in the third week of July as the security forces
and the Awami League cracked down on the protesters. The attacks were intensified on July 18th, when
53 people suffered deadly injuries, and on the following day, the number rose by threefold.
On the evening of July 19th, following around a hundred deaths and at least a dozen severely injured
protesters, the Hasina regime imposed a curfew with “shoot-at-sight” orders starting at midnight on
July 20th. The number of fatal injuries from bullet wounds significantly declined in the following
days; however, they surged again on August 4th when the armed cadres of the Awami League became
particularly active following a directive from the party to its members to “gather” in every ward,
district, and city.
📅 July 16: Abu Sayed and four others killed as
Awami League’s student and youth wing attack.
📅 July 17: Police excesses cause deaths in
Jatrabari, people retaliate.
📅 July 18: Violent crackdown begins as students
from private universities and colleges block major roads demanding justice.
📅 July 19: Massacre unfolds in Dhaka and other
districts, as the government take a more militarised approach.
📅 July 20: Curfew imposed in major cities.
📅 July 21: Protesters defy curfew only to be
killed; arrests rise.
📅 July 22: Media reports reveal casualties
mounting; violent incidents drop.
📅 Aug 2: Situation remains tense; sporadic
clashes claimed lives.
📅 Aug 3: Street fights continue as human‑rights
groups demand investigation.
📅 Aug 4: Over a hundred killed in a day as armed
Awami League cadres join security forces.
📅 Aug 5: Thousands of people march to Dhaka as
police open fire, killing hundreds; the regime collapsed.
Numerous photographs and videos from that day captured Awami League members parading in the streets
armed with military-grade weapons, sharp machetes, and blunt objects. Notably, half of the victims
who suffered fatal injuries leading to their deaths were harmed by these Awami League members or
armed cadres backed by the party, allegedly killing 86.
On August 5th, at least 267 people suffered fatal injuries; some died on that day, and others
succumbed to their injuries in the following months.
97.6% of victims died from gunshot wounds, confirming systematic use of firearms.
During curfew period (July 20–22), 100% of victims were shot.
Physical violence (stabbing, beating) peaked during initial escalation phase.
Lethal weapons were widely used in the key entry points of Dhaka city.
A massacre approved by the ‘Core Committee’
All of the country’s chiefs of security forces and intelligence agencies comprised this ‘core’
committee, according to the UN’s human rights office’s report on the massacre, published in February
2025. It was headed by the then Home Minister, Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal.
The committee met on July 18th for the first time and decided to engage the paramilitary force BGB,
which carries military-grade weapons used in wars. The high death toll in Wari and Narayanganj,
among other zones and districts, is linked to a strategic decision made by the then Awami League
government.
Kamal ordered the security forces to clear the thousands of protesters who were blocking the
Dhaka-Chattogram highway (N1), the country’s economic lifeline, according to the OHCHR report.
Wari’s Jatrabari area is the gateway to the Dhaka-Chattogram highway, which passes through
Narayanganj’s Chittagong Road.
Police and security forces became increasingly desperate to remove the protesters from the two areas
that sit on the highway. From July 19th to July 22nd, at least 72 individuals suffered fatal
injuries in these areas.
According to our analysis, all but one of the victims who were shot in Narayanganj were shot in areas
adjacent to the highway. However, the actual numbers may be higher.
More than 70 victims died on the Dhaka-Chattogram highway after the Core Committee meeting
of July 18th 2024.
Netra News captured photographs of senior police officials visiting Jatrabari on July 22nd after the
‘successful’ clearing operation. At least three of these officials — IGP Chowdhury Abdullah
Al-Mamun, RAB DG Harun Ar Rashid, and Special Branch Chief Monirul Islam — joined the Core Committee
meeting with the then Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal on July 18th.
The following is the list of individuals who made up this committee: Former chief of police Chowdhury
Abdullah Al-Mamun; the BGB Director General, Major General Mohammad Ashrafuzzaman Siddiqui; the head of the
RAB, Harun-Ar-Rashid (under United States sanctions); Major General A. K. M. Aminul Haque, Director
General of Ansar and the Village Defence Party; the head of the DGFI, Major General Hamidul Haque;
the chief of the National Security Intelligence (NSI), Major General Hossain Al Morshed; Monirul
Islam, chief of the police’s Special Branch; and Ziaul Ahsan, the head of the NTMC.
The UN report also claims that a general from the Bangladesh Army joined the committee from July
20th, shortly after the imposition of a nationwide curfew.
Top police officials, the Chief of Special Branch Md Monirul Islam (second from left),
Inspector
General of Police Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun (third from left) and RAB’s Director General Md
Harun-Ar-Rashid,
visiting the Jatrabari area after the apparently successful ‘cleansing operation’ on July 22nd 2024.
Photo: Jibon Ahmed, July 22nd 2024
July 19: Enter BNP and Jamaat activists
In the state-sponsored massacre, 12.22% of the victims were members or activists of the BNP,
according to their families and news reports, while 2.13% were from Jamaat. However, both parties
claim higher figures.
Netra News asked the family members of the victims and reviewed the news reports to ascertain whether
the victims were involved with any political party. Our findings indicate that 88 victims were
leaders or activists of the BNP or its affiliated organisations, while 15 victims were associated
with Jamaat or its affiliated groups.
However, it is likely that many family members of the victims may not be aware of their political
affiliations, as they lived far away from them; hence, the number is not accurate and might not
capture the full extent of the parties’ loss during the protests.
Even so, it provides a crucial pattern.
Our analysis shows that, though a member of BNP’s student wing, Chhatra Dal, died on July 16th, the
party started losing its activists in large numbers from July 19th. It lost 25 of its activists and
leaders on the streets on that day, with two deaths on July 20th and three on July 21st, suggesting
that the party got involved with the movement on July 19th.
BNP was heavily active on August 4th, and almost one-fifth of the victims of the day were party
leaders or activists. On the following day, the party lost 34 of its men.
Jamaat lost three activists on July 19th, the highest in July, and ten on August 5th. At least one
member of Gana Sanghati Andolan, Gono Odhikar Parishad and Islami Andolan Bangladesh died, too,
during the protests.
However, not everyone on the martyrs’ list belonging to these parties was active in the protest. Some
of them died while crossing the road or returning from work, according to our analysis based on
testimonies of family members and news reports.
Who were the perpetrators
Most of the victims died allegedly at the hands of the police, followed by the armed cadres of the
Awami League.
Our tally — verified by victims’ families, witnesses and news reports — indicates that police
inflicted deadly injuries on at least 467 victims. The police were most brutal on July 19th and
August 5th. In 61 cases, police worked with the BGB to shoot at the protesters, and given the
complex nature of the situation, it has been extremely difficult for the witnesses and journalists
to ascertain whose shots took the lives of the victims.
It is also likely that the witnesses might have used police interchangeably to describe the members
of the security forces in some cases.
According to our analysis, at least 43 victims died as a result of coordinated attacks by the Awami
League and the police, and 27 more died at the hands of the BGB. In two instances, witnesses
reported that the army shot the victims. On August 4th, during a protest in Sherpur, a government
official's car struck and killed at least two protesters.
467POLICE
86AWAMI LEAGUE
63POLICE-BGB
43POLICE-AL
27BGB
19OTHERS
Notes on discrepancies
To comply with the official definition of martyrs, according to the “July Mass Uprising Martyrs’
Families
and Injured Students-Citizens Welfare and Rehabilitation Ordinance, 2025”, issued on June 17th
2025,
in this analysis, we have considered only the victims who lost their lives in state-backed
excesses by
security forces and Awami League men. However, the list released by the government does not
fully comply
with its own ‘martyr’ criteria.
In some of the cases, the surrounding circumstances of their deaths did not meet the criteria for
being
classified as massacre victims, or “martyrs.”
For example, we have found the names of police officials in the list as well, who were killed,
according
to their families and news reports, by protesters. We have found at least one victim in the list
who was
mistaken for an Awami League activist and was killed by protesters.
Through news articles and interviews, we identified that six individuals on the list died of
natural causes.
Two others passed away due to injuries sustained on August 6th; two of them were killed while
attempting to
breach the prison’s security, according to news reports.
Methodology
Netra News collected the list of victims from the gazette
that mentioned 834 names,
and reached out
to the families to collect the location where the victims were injured, the cause of
their deaths,
the alleged perpetrators, their age and political affiliation. We verified the
information from at
least two news articles published in national and, in some cases, local newspapers.
Of 834 victims’ families, 666 responded to our call. The remaining families either
did not respond to
our call, despite repeated attempts, or their numbers were found to be switched off.
Five families
of victims responded to our call but refused to share any information.
After collecting the information from the families, we looked for the victims’ names
in the
newspapers published during and after the massacre. We have found necessary and
relevant information
in several national and local dailies confirming 750 victims who suffered fatal
injuries from July
16th to August 5th and consequently died.
We have collected information about the victims whose family members could not be
reached from at
least two news reports. We also spoke with the protest mobilisers and witnesses from
different areas
to confirm the details of the clashes that led to their deaths.
Among these victims, 705 lost their lives due to the excesses of the security forces
and members of
the Awami League.
The rest of the victims whose information was verified but not included
in the analysis,
died due to various reasons after Sheikh Hasina fled. The majority of them were
burnt in houses
or hotels owned by Awami League leaders, and at least one of them was electrocuted.
Regarding the remaining victims — 84 in total — Netra News was either unable to
gather
sufficient information for analysis, primarily because their deaths were not
adequately
reported in major newspapers, and family members did not respond to our repeated
calls,
or the information collected by Netra News regarding their deaths was insufficient
to
conclude with a high degree of confidence.
On July 1st, 2025, the interim government added 10 more names to the list of
834 martyrs.
Reporting and data analysis by
Aaqib Md
Shatil;
and design by
Subinoy Mustofi
Eron.
Marzia Hashmi Momo, Miraz Hossain, Md Nafiul Islam, Rafa Tanzim Sneha, Arif Raihan, Rubayet
Alam,
and Tasmim Bintay Haque assisted with the research.